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COMMENT

STOPPING STEUBENVILLE: REDUCING CASES OF
ADOLESCENT SEXUAL ASSAULT INVOLVING ALCOHOL
Alexandra Schiffrin*
While the Steubenville Rape Case 1 garnered much attention
for the role that social media played in initiating the prosecution
and inciting national outrage, the underlying legal issue was the
victim’s incapacity to consent because of self-induced
intoxication. 2 The case surrounded the August 12, 2012 sexual
assault of an intoxicated sixteen-year-old girl by two high school
football players, Trent Mays and Ma’lik Richmond, after a party in
Steubenville, Ohio.3 Following the prominent coverage of the
incident across social media channels and in the news, Mays and
Richmond—who were charged with raping the sixteen-year-old
girl—were often portrayed as the real victims; observers blamed
the female victim for partying and putting herself in a position to
be violated. 4 Ultimately, the juvenile court held that the victim
was so intoxicated that she was unable to give consent, finding
Mays and Richmond guilty of rape. Judge Thomas Lipps, who
presided over the trial, warned that the young men’s behavior was
a “cautionary lesson” in how adolescents conduct themselves in
the presence of alcohol.5
The Steubenville Rape Case is but one of many incidents
involving adolescents, alcohol, and sexual assault. This Comment
*
1.

Splits

J.D. Candidate, December 2014, University of Michigan Law School.

See generally Juliet Macur & Nate Schweber, Rape Case Unfolds on Web and
City,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
16,
2012,
at
D1,
available
at

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/sports/high-school-football-rape-case-unfolds-onlineand-divides-steubenville-ohio.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
2.
See generally Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Ohio Teenagers Guilty in Rape That Social
Media Brought to Light, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2013, at A10, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/18/us/teenagers-found-guilty-in-rape-in-steubenvilleohio.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
3.
Macur & Schweber, supra note 1.
4.
Id.
5.
Oppel, supra note 2.
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proposes a new legal standard for consent in sexual assault cases
involving minors using alcohol or drugs. The standard should be
a strict liability regime where it is impermissible for minors to
engage in sexual relations if one or both parties are under the
influence of alcohol or drugs, regardless of how or whether
intoxication was involuntary or voluntary. Intoxication
undermines the capacity for valid consent and, with minors,
should negate consent completely.
I. The Prevalence of Sexual Assault
Approximately forty-four percent of sexual violence victims
are under eighteen-years-old, 6 and seventy-eight percent of the
victims knew the offender. 7 About fifty-three percent of
adolescents reported drinking or taking drugs and being sexually
assaulted by someone known for less than twenty-four hours. 8
Acquaintance rape involving drugs or alcohol is prevalent on
college campuses. In a study conducted by psychologist Mary
Koss, one-in-four college women had experienced rape or
attempted rape. 9 Roughly eighty-four percent were committed by
a perpetrator known to the victim, and the majority involved
alcohol or drugs. 10 The study found that seventy-five percent of
the males and fifty-five percent of the females involved in

6.
Who are the Victims?, RAPE ABUSE AND INCEST NATIONAL NETWORK (2009),
http://www.rainn.org/get-information/statistics/sexual-assault-victims (citing U.S. BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS, at iii, (1997), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/SOO.PDF).
7.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEMALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE 1994–2010 3–4 (2013),
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fvsv9410.pdf (reporting that between 2005
and 2010, sexual violence was committed against females ages twelve to seventeen at a rate
of 4.1 per 1,000 and against females ages eighteen to thirty-four at a slightly lower rate of
3.7 per 1,000).
8.
Joanne Archambault, Dynamics of Sexual Assault, SEXUAL ASSAULT TRAINING &
INVESTIGATIONS 1, 3, http:// www.mysati.com/joannepubs.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2013)
(citing SUSAN PARKER LINDSAY, AN EPIDEMIOLOGIC STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF VICTIM AGE
AND RELATIONSHIP TO THE SUSPECT ON THE RESULTS OF E VIDENTIARY EXAMINATIONS AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT OUTCOMES IN CASES OF REPORTED SEXUAL ASSAULT (1998)).
9.
Karen M. Kramer, Note, Rule By Myth: The Social and Legal Dynamics Governing
Alcohol-Related Acquaintance Rapes, 47 STAN. L. REV. 115, 116 (1994) (citing Robin
Warshaw, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE: THE M S. REPORT ON RECOGNIZING, FIGHTING, AND
SURVIVING DATE AND ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 11 (1988)).
10. Id.
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acquaintance rape reported drinking or taking drugs prior to an
attack. 11
Additionally, it is important to take into consideration the
gendered nature of sexual assault. It is committed
overwhelmingly, though of course not exclusively, by men,
usually against women. 12 Eighteen to twenty-five percent of
American women have been victims of an attempted or complete
rape in their lifetimes. 13 According to the U.S. Department of
Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, between 1995 and 2010,
approximately ninety-one percent of all rape or sexual assault
victims were women. 14
Our society maintains a double standard toward men and
women who drink: when a perpetrator is drunk, it reduces his
culpability, while an intoxicated victim faces increased
culpability.15 Studies of simulated and actual jury decisions
demonstrate that jurors found intoxicated offenders less culpable
than sober offenders and intoxicated women more blameworthy
than sober women.16 Alcohol consumption is not an invitation to
be exploited and violated, nor is it an excuse for men to use
alcohol as a “weapon for sexual aggression.” 17 Legal standards

11. Id. (citing ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE: THE MS. REPORT ON
RECOGNIZING, FIGHTING, AND SURVIVING DATE AND ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 44 (1988)).
12. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEMALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE; U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 2003 NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY 7 (2003), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv03.pdf. While recognizing it is an oversimplification,
the Comment refers to victims as females and perpetrators as males because of the data
supporting the contention that females are more often the victims and males are more
often the perpetrators.
13. Who are the Victims?, supra note 6 (citing PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES,
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE & CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, PREVALENCE,
INCIDENCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST W OMEN SURVEY 2 (1998), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/172837.pdf); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 753
(Foundation Press, 2d ed. 2007) (citing, e.g., MARY P. KOSS ET. AL., NO SAFE HAVEN: MALE
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AT HOME, AT WORK, AND IN THE COMMUNITY 167–71 (1994)
(collecting major studies on rape prevalence completed as of 1994, many showing
approximately twenty percent of women raped)).
14. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 3.
15. Kramer, supra note 8, at 121.
16. Id. at 131.
17. Id. at 122–23 (“[S]ome men deliberately use alcohol as a weapon for sexual
aggression. A 1986 study found that 75 percent of college men reported using alcohol or
drugs in an attempt to obtain sex from an unwilling woman . . . . Similarly, a 1989 study
concluded that ‘[t]he use of alcohol to obtain sex from women is pervasive . . . . [A]lcohol is
the major tool used to gain sexual mastery over women.’ ”) (citations omitted).
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need to attempt to curb this systemic gender bias.
II. Existing Standards
The Model Penal Code (“MPC”) and most state penal codes do
address alcohol-related sexual assaults. 18 They contain provisions
defining sexual assault to include situations in which the
defendant has sexual intercourse with an unconscious person, the
defendant administers intoxicants to the victim, or the victim’s
ability to resist is substantially impaired by alcohol or drugs. 19
However, these provisions are inadequate in protecting sexual
assault victims, particularly adolescents, who have voluntarily
drunk alcohol or taken drugs and are, therefore, incapable of
consenting to sexual activity. The shortcomings of each provision
will be discussed in turn.

A. Unconscious Victim
The MPC and most state statutes criminalize sexual conduct
with an unconscious person, 20 and many state statutes 21 and the
MPC are explicit in their prohibition. The MPC states that a man is
guilty of rape if he has sexual intercourse with an unconscious
female. 22 Idaho similarly lists one of the circumstances of rape
“where [the victim] is at the time unconscious of the nature of the
act.” 23 Other states ban sexual conduct with unconscious
individuals by incorporating unconsciousness into the definition
of physically helpless. For example, in New York, an individual is
considered incapable of consent when he or she is mentally
18. Id. at 124–25; see Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Drugs: A Statutory Overview and
Proposals for Reform, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 131, 170 (2002) (forty-seven of the fifty-six

jurisdictions in the United States explicitly mention intoxicants in one or more of their
sexual offenses).
19. Kramer, supra note 8, at 124; Christine Chambers Goodman, Protecting the Party
Girl: A New Approach for Evaluating Intoxicated Consent, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 57, 69
(2009).
20. Kramer, supra note 8, at 124–25.
21. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111(A)(5) (West 2013) (“at the time
unconscious of the nature of the act”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A)(4) (West 2013) (“victim
is unconscious, asleep or otherwise physically helpless or suffers from a mental condition . .
.”).
22. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(c) (1962) (amended 1985).
23. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101 (West 2013) (The statute goes on to define
“unconscious of the nature of the act” as “incapable of resisting because the victim . . . was
unconscious or asleep [or] was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that the act
occurred”).
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disabled, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless, 24 where
“physically helpless” means “a person is unconscious or for any
other reason is physically unable to communicate unwillingness
to an act.”25
While the prohibitions on sexual conduct with unconscious
individuals provide a bright line rule, they are not protective
enough. Waiting until a victim has passed out completely—which
evinces total incapacity—to trigger criminal conduct within the
purview of the MPC and other criminal statutes is unreasonable.
The law must protect victims who, although not completely
incapacitated, are intoxicated to a point where they can no longer
meaningfully consent to sexual conduct.

B. Administration of Intoxicant by Defendant
Sixteen jurisdictions and the MPC require the defendant to
personally administer intoxicants to the victim before criminal
liability for sexual conduct with the victim is triggered. 26 A few
states stipulate that the defendant must administer the intoxicants
without the victim’s knowledge or against the victim’s will before
the defendant becomes criminally liable. 27
The administration requirement leaves victims who
voluntarily drink or take drugs vulnerable unless they fall into an
alternative category, like unconsciousness, which would then be
independently sufficient to trigger criminal liability. However,
some states, rightfully, do not require the administration
element. 28 The California Penal Code removes the condition that
the victim’s intoxication be involuntary. Rape occurs “[w]here a
person is prevented from resisting by any intoxicating or
anesthetic substance, or any controlled substance, and this
condition was known, or reasonably should have been known by
the accused.” 29 Such language correctly deemphasizes the
24. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(3) (McKinney 2013).
25. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(7) (McKinney 2013).
26. Falk, supra note 17, at 168.
27. Id. at 169; see, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-3002(a)(4) (2013) (“by force, or threat of force,
or without the knowledge or permission”), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(b) (West 2013)
(“without the knowledge or against the will”).
28. Falk, supra note 17, at 169–70 (noting that eight jurisdictions do not require the
administration element, and that three of these jurisdictions amended their rape statutes in
the late 1980s and 1990s to eliminate the administration element).
29. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(3) (West 2013).
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perpetrator’s role in the victim’s intoxication and permits the
victim to be treated as impaired if he or she knowingly became
intoxicated.

C. Substantial Impairment
In adjudicating rape, some jurisdictions take into
consideration circumstances where a victim’s ability to resist is
substantially impaired by alcohol or drugs. For example, in
Massachusetts, a trial judge is required to instruct the jury on
capacity to consent “in any case where the evidence would support
a finding that because of the consumption of drugs or alcohol or
for some other reason . . . the complainant was so impaired as to
be incapable of consenting to intercourse.” 30 Other states have
statutes that frame substantial impairment as incapacity to
consent when the victim is unable to appraise or control her
conduct or unable to communicate her unwillingness to act. 31
Although a step better than the unconsciousness or
administration varieties of rape statutes, substantial impairment is
still an elusive concept; it is entirely too vague and challenging
for juries to work with, which may lead to inconsistent results
depending on the judge’s jury instructions and jury’s
interpretation of when an individual has become too incapacitated
to consent. 32 It is difficult to describe a degree of intoxication in
general and even more difficult to quantify the degree of
intoxication that substantially impairs a particular individual’s
decision-making.
III. Proposed Legal Standard
While the MPC and state statutes strive to defend against
alcohol-related sexual assaults, the unconscious, administration,
and substantial impairment requirements narrow the protective
30. Commonwealth v. Blache, 880 N.E.2d 736, 743 (Mass. 2008).
31. Falk, supra note 17, at 195–96; see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §3-301(c) (West
2013) (defining a mentally incapacitated individual as one who “because of the influence of
a drug, narcotic, or intoxicating substance . . . is rendered substantially incapable of: (1)
appraising the nature of the individual's conduct; or (2) resisting vaginal intercourse, a
sexual act, or sexual contact”).
32. See, e.g., Blache, 880 N.E.2d at 753 (Spina, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (explaining that a substantial impairment standard “needlessly complicates certain
rape cases, and has great potential to produce unfair results for defendants and unwanted
intrusions into the private affairs of complainants”).
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scope of these statues to a limited number of circumstances and,
therefore, do not adequately defend the entire adolescent victim
population. The law needs to be reformed to adequately protect
intoxicated adolescents from unwanted, nonconsensual sexual
activity.
A minor’s intoxication should always negate informed
consent. Legally, consent is not equivalent to free choice. Sexual
activity, when parties have been drinking alcohol or using drugs,
may appear to be consensual. However, consent must be internal
as well as external. It must be affirmative, freely-given, wanted,
and communicated clearly. 33 These conditions cannot be met if
either of the involved parties is under the influence of an
intoxicant, making strict liability the appropriate standard.
In crafting a strict liability regime where it is impermissible
for minors to engage in sexual relations if one or both parties are
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, this Comment’s proposed
legal standard of consent for minors uses language from the 1992
amendment to the Canadian Criminal Code 34 and Karen Kramer’s
modification of consent from the Canadian Criminal Code, put
forth in her Note entitled the Rule By Myth: The Social and Legal

Dynamics Governing Alcohol-Related Acquaintance Rapes. 35
The proposed standard of consent for minors provides:
(1) No consent is obtained where:

(a) The complainant was wholly or intermittently
unconscious;
(b) The complainant was asleep;
(c) The accused administered or provided an intoxicant to
the complainant; or

33. Catharine A. MacKinnon, A Sex Equality Approach to Sexual Assault, 989 ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 265, 270 (2003).
34. An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Sexual Assault), S.C. 1992, c. 38, §§ 273.1-.2
(Can.) (redefining the legal standard for consent and the mistaken belief in consent
defenses).
35. Kramer, supra note 8, at 152–54.
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(d) The complainant and/or the accused consumed an
intoxicant.
(2) It is not a defense that:
(a) The complainant expressed, by words or conduct, an
agreement to engage in the sexual activity;
(b) The complainant expressed, by words or conduct, an
agreement to engage in the sexual activity before becoming
intoxicated;
(c) The complainant remained silent during the sexual
activity;
(d) The accused believed the complainant consented to the
activity; or
(e) The accused did not take reasonable steps, in the
circumstances known to the accused at the time, to ascertain
that the complainant was intoxicated. It will be assumed that
the accused did not take reasonable steps, if the complainant
was visibly intoxicated, displaying:
(i) Observable physical weakening (including but not
limited to inability to stand, difficult sitting or walking,
disorientation, lethargy, and vomiting);
(ii) Diminished comprehension or perception, loss of
memory, or confusion; or
(iii) Impaired verbal ability (including but not limited
to slurring or uncharacteristic outbursts).
The proposed standard expands the concept of incapacitation
to include those who are both wholly and intermittently
unconscious as well as those with any level of intoxication. This
framework catches the myriad conditions that may occur as a
result of intoxication and inhibit a person’s ability to consent,
including
those
uncovered
by
the
unconsciousness,
administration, and substantial impairment elements of current
criminal statutes.
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IV. Defending A Strict Liability Regime

A. Adolescents are in Special Need of Protection
Some would contend that such a policy demeans, not
enhances, consent. It is common knowledge that people’s varying
alcohol tolerances lead to significant differences in an individual’s
capacity to give legitimate consent. However, adolescents are
often just beginning to experiment with alcohol and drugs.
“Alcohol and drugs distort reality, cloud judgment, and slow
reactions, causing men and women to expose themselves to
dangers or disregard social constraints that might otherwise
influence them.” 36 These consequences may be amplified for
adolescents who do not know their own tolerances or the effect
alcohol or drugs will have on their behavior.37 This makes the
necessity of a strict-liability regime in these circumstances even
more pressing.

B. Changing Adolescent Behavior
The proposed standard does not seek to clamp down on
adolescent sexual behavior. However, requiring adolescents to be
sober in order to engage in sexual conduct may lead to positive
externalities from better decision-making, including reduction in
sexually transmitted infections and teenage pregnancy. It may be
argued that the strict liability approach is paternalistic. However,
it is our duty as a society to address prevalent problems and
protect vulnerable sectors of the population, and we have already
done so through other policies such as statutory rape laws,
prohibitions on underage drinking, and zero tolerance laws for
drinking and driving for minors.
In addition to offering more robust legal protection for
adolescent victims, the zero-tolerance approach to intoxication
addresses alcohol myopia, which causes intoxicated perpetrators

36. Valerie M. Ryan, Comment, Intoxicating Encounters: Allocating Responsibility in
the Law of Rape, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 407, 412 (2004) (quoting ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER

CALLED IT RAPE: THE M S. REPORT ON RECOGNIZING, FIGHTING, AND SURVIVING DATE AND
ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 44 (1988)).
37. See,
e.g.,
Why
21,
MOTHERS
AGAINST
DRUNK
DRIVING,
http://www.madd.org/underage-drinking/why21/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2013) (“Teens get
drunk twice as fast as adults, but have more trouble knowing when to stop. Teens naturally
overdo it and binge more often than adults.”).

Stopping Steubenville

2013

19

to feel less conflicted about engaging in socially unacceptable
behavior, such as sexually aggressive conduct, and, therefore,
more likely to engage in it. 38 Alcohol causes perpetrators to
become less aware of a victim’s consent, more forceful, and more
violent than when sober. 39
Additionally, the bright line rule of consumption of any
quantity or amount of an intoxicant ensures that perpetrators do
not have to make a judgment call, particularly when they may be
intoxicated as well. Perpetrators will not bear the burden of
assessing a victim’s condition and determining if he or she is
intoxicated to the point of incapacitation. They will, however, have
to assume the risk of committing sexual assault if they do not
determine whether or not a victim has consumed an intoxicant,
which in many cases will be easily observed. If a perpetrator is
unsure, he or she simply has to ask.
There is always the possibility that one of the parties will lie
and deny intoxication, making enforcement difficult. Additionally,
this strict liability standard certainly places a high burden an
adolescent who is himself intoxicated, and it may therefore hold
liable some whom society may see as the least culpable type of
offender. However, these should be the outliers, and adolescents
should learn to be more cautious in situations where alcohol is
available. If the perpetrator has any doubt, he or she should
refrain from pursuing sex. The standard will promote better
communication between adolescents before engaging in sexual
activity and might positively shape future sexual relations.

C. Effectiveness of Strict Liability Regimes
Strict liability regimes certainly create their own set of
problems; they are not a panacea, but with such a pervasive
concern as sexual assault, the benefits outweigh the costs. While it
is possible that the proposed legal standard will lead to a
significant increase in arrests, it may instead not be enforced.
Additionally, courts may be filled with many first-time offenders
who may be viewed as less of a threat to the public than other
perpetrators, such as serial rapists or child molesters. Adolescents
will face serious personal consequences associated with being

38.
39.

Goodman, supra note 18, at 84–85.

Id.
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prosecuted and convicted as a “sex offender” for the rest of their
lives. Nonetheless, current societal attitudes do not take into
consideration the seriousness of the crime of sexual assault and its
broader implications. Sexual assault is a serious crime and
deserves a serious punishment, and the legal system must respond
more forcefully.
Existing state “zero tolerance” laws should instill confidence
that strict liability can be not only workable but also successful.
Since the 1980s, numerous states have enacted zero tolerance
statutes, making the operation of a motor vehicle by an
intoxicated minor a criminal offense. 40 For example, New York
State’s zero tolerance law penalizes persons under the age of
twenty-one who operate a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level
of 0.02 percent to 0.07 percent. 41 According to the United States
Department of Transportation, zero tolerance laws have reduced
youth drinking and driving.42 “They likely did so for two reasons:
by deterring youth through the fear of losing their driver’s license
if they drive after drinking, and also by reinforcing the broad
community disapproval of driving after drinking.” 43 Therefore,
strict liability standards can deter behavior and shape attitudes.
V. Conclusion
This Comment’s proposal protects voluntarily intoxicated
adolescents—who have largely been neglected by current
statutes—from sexual assault, eliminates miscommunications
among adolescents, and disincentivizes perpetrators from using
alcohol as a weapon to remove a victim’s reluctance to engage in a
sexual activity. It is irrelevant how a victim has become
intoxicated. A woman should not have to assume the risk of
sexual assault if she is voluntarily intoxicated, and a man should
40. Marjorie A. Shields, Validity, Construction, and Application of State “Zero
Tolerance” Laws Relating to Underage Drinking and Driving, 34 A.L.R.6th 623 (2008).

41. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192-a (McKinney 2013) (setting the minimum blood
alcohol content at 0.02 not 0 because certain products, such as cough syrups and
mouthwashes, contain alcohol, and some families permit consumption of small amounts of
alcohol for religious or family functions).
42. J.H. HEDLUND, R.G. ULMER AND D.F. PREUSSER, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT HS 809
348, DETERMINE WHY THERE ARE FEWER YOUNG ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED DRIVERS (2001)
available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/research/feweryoungdrivers/index.htm#toc
(citing studies showing reductions of youth alcohol-related crashes from eleven to twentyfour percent).
43. Id.
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not be allowed to exploit a woman’s intoxication as an excuse for
sexual aggression.

